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THE FAUX PAS OF AUTOMATIC
STAY UNDER THE INDIAN
ARBITRATION ACT, 1996 - THE
HCC DICTUM, TWO-CHERRY
DOCTRINE, AND BEYOND
Sai Ramani Garimella1 and Gautam Mohanty2
ABSTRACT
In the matter of Hindustan Construction. Co. v.
Union of India, the Honorable Supreme Court of India
(“SCI”) was presented with an opportunity to adjudicate
upon a petition challenging the constitutional validity of
Section 87 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996
(“1996 Act”) as inserted by Section 13 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act of 2019 (“2019 Act").3 The
legislative insertion stated that amendments made to the
1996 Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 2015
(“2015 Act”) would not apply to court proceedings arising
out of, or in relation to, arbitral proceedings initiated before
the commencement of the 2015 Act, i.e., October 23, 2015,
1
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irrespective of whether such court proceedings were
commenced prior or after the 2015 Act.4 As is so often the
case with constitutional challenges, following an expansive
and intricate analysis, the SCI, by its decision dated
November 27, 2019, struck down Section 87 of the 1996 Act
on grounds of it being contrary to the fundamental essence
behind the implementation of the 1996 Act and violative of
Article 14 of the 1950 Constitution of India (“1950
Constitution”).5 Through this research, the authors attempt
to analyze the possible ramifications of the aforesaid
judgement against the backdrop of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law (“UNCITRAL Model Law”), Indian Arbitration
law, and relevant applicable constitutional principles of
India.6 The authors also attempt to expound upon the twocherry doctrine and its relevance in the context of Indian
arbitral jurisprudence while juxtaposing it with the position
of the UNCITRAL Model Law.7
INTRODUCTION
This research attempts an incisive analysis of a
landmark decision in the arbitral jurisprudence of India
rendered by the SCI that conclusively settled the debate
concerning the applicability of the amended provisions of
the 2015 Act to arbitration and court proceedings. In
Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India (“HCC”),8 the
SCI, while opining that Section 87 of the 2019 Act reversed
the beneficial effects of the 2015 Act,9 declared the
4

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
6
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
7
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
8
AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
9
Section 87 was introduced after deleting Section 26 of the 2015 Act, which
stipulated that the 2015 Act will not:
apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the
principal Act, before the commencement of this Act
unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply
5
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abovementioned statutory provision as contrary to the ethos
of the statute and the progressive arbitral jurisprudence in
India. The rationale of the SCI, inter alia, was premised on:
(i) Section 87 of the 1996 Act is in contravention to Article
36(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law; (ii) the mischief
caused by Section 87 of the 1996 Act resulting in “automatic
stay” was against the aims and objectives of the 1996 Act;
(iii) Section 87 of the 1996 Act underhandedly makes
Section 35 of the 1996 Act otiose by questioning the finality
of arbitral awards; and (iv) Section 87 of the 1996 Act is
violative of Article 14 of the 1950 Constitution by depriving
an award-holder from enjoying the benefits of a successful
arbitration.10
This research is set out as follows: Section I sets out
the timeline leading to the Hindustan Construction Co.
decision, including the position before and after the
enactment of the 1996 Act and the 2015 Act. Section II
describes the two-cherry doctrine as postulated in the
judgement vis-à-vis the 1996 Act. Section III focuses on the
constitutionality aspect of the judgement. Section IV
identifies the statutory avenues for the award-debtor and the
award-creditor in presenting their respective applications for
relief. Section IV also attempts to map a methodology for
the exercise of discretion by the Indian courts drawing
guidance from international judicial practice.
Notably, Hindustan Construction Co. addressed the
constitutionality and scope of Section 36 of the 1996 Act
entailing automatic suspension on the execution of the award
following the existence of an application challenging the
award per Section 34 of the 1996 Act.11 This issue was also
previously considered by the SCI and the Gujarat High Court
respectively in two separate judgements. In National
in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after
the date of commencement of this Act.
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §26.
10
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
11
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
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Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd., the SCI,
while considering the scope of Section 36, observed that
automatic stay defeated the objective of the 1996 Act.12
However, the Court reserved its opinion on the matter and
merely recommended the legislature consider an amendment
to the aforesaid provision:
11. However, we do notice that this
automatic suspension of the execution of
the award, the moment an application
challenging the said award is filed under
Section 34 of the Act leaving no discretion
in the court to put the parties on terms, in
our opinion, defeats the very objective of
the alternate dispute resolution system to
which arbitration belongs. We do find that
there is a recommendation made by the
Ministry concerned to Parliament to amend
Section 34 with a proposal to empower the
civil court to pass suitable interim orders in
such cases. In view of the urgency of such
amendment, we sincerely hope that
necessary steps would be taken by the
authorities concerned at the earliest to
bring about the required change in law.13
In Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Shah
Bimani Chemicals Private Ltd., Section 36 of the 1996 Act
was unsuccessfully challenged for being beyond the statute’s
12
Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540
(India); see also Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Port of Mumbai, (2014) 1
ARBLR 512 (Bombay) and Radheshyam Shaw v. Union of India, AIR 2009
(NOC) 309 (Calcutta). While National Aluminum Co. (“NALCO”) discussed
the powers of the Supreme Court to order under Section 42 of the 1996 Act, the
Bombay High Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd., while deciding upon a
Section 9 application for interim relief, observed that admission of a Section 34
petition paralyzed the process for the winning party/award-creditor. Afcons
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Port of Mumbai, (2014) 1 ARBLR 512 (Bombay).
13
Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540
(India).
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scope and objectives.14 The Gujarat High Court observed
that the respondent failed to illustrate any inconsistency in
the legislative competence of Parliament or in relation to any
other provision of the 1950 Constitution after finding
agreement with the legislative wisdom of allowing for
enforcement of the arbitral award.15 It is also noteworthy
that following the decision of the SCI in National Aluminum
Co.,16 two judgements of the Calcutta High Court and Delhi
High Court categorically mirrored the view of the SCI in
calling for a radical revamp of the provisions of the 1996
Act.17 The Calcutta High Court in Sarkar & Sarkar v. State
of West Bengal observed that the exercise, prima facie, of the
right to appeal available to the unsuccessful litigant under
Section 37 of Act, 1996 does not operate as an automatic stay
on the execution, and that such order be obtained by the
unsuccessful litigant before the court.18 The Delhi High
Court’s observation in Décor India Private Ltd. v. National
Building Construction Corp.,19 seemingly a precursor to
Hindustan Construction Co., echoed a similar opinion:
15. Now if the execution of the Decree
followed by [the] Award is to be delayed
by treating the pendency of Appeal as
automatic stay then the new legislation i.e.,
the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996[,]
instead of being an efficient and speedy
14

Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Shah Bimani Chems. Priv. Ltd.,
(2009) 2 ARBLR 287, 291 (Gujarat); Nat’l Bldg. Constr. Corp. v. Lloyds
Insulation India Ltd., (2005) (Supp) ARBLR 563 (India).
15
Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Shah Bimani Chemicals Priv.
Ltd., (2009) 2 ARBLR 287, 291 (Gujarat).
16
Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540
(India).
17
Sarkar & Sarkar v. State of W. Bengal, (2006) 4 ARBLR 379 (India); Décor
India Priv. Ltd. v. Nat’l Bldg. Constr., (2007) 3 ARBLR 348 (India).
18
Sarkar & Sarkar v. State of W. Bengal (2006), 4 ARBLR 379 (India)
(emphasis added).
19
Décor India Priv. Ltd. v. Nat’l Bldg. Constr. Corp., (2007) 3 ARBLR 348
(India).
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remedy[,] would be reduced to a remedy
worse than what we already had, that is the
civil suits and the deep routed procedural
delays till passing of the decree and even
thereafter. [ ] [W]e may hasten to add that
even in civil suits' decrees[,] there is no
automatic stay on pendency of the
Appeal[.] [S]tay[—]even if granted in
execution of civil suits' decrees[—] is more
often than not . . . conditional [ ] and
preferably subject to deposit of the decretal
amount. Had the legislature intended to
give the provision of stay of execution on
filing of an Appeal under Section 37 of the
Act, it would have given the provision in
the Act itself, in pari materia with Order
XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Since it has not been done by the
legislature, in our view, it will not be
possible to provide unconditional
automatic stay under the principle of
merger. So[,] from whatever angle we
examine
this
proposition,
the
interpretation, in our view, falls in favour
of non-automatic stay.20
In the backdrop of the aforesaid judgments, this
research attempts to analyze the Hindustan Construction Co.
decision and its impact on the enforceability of arbitral
awards in India.
I – ARBITRATION – THROUGH THE ANNALS OF
THE LAW
This research is premised upon an assertion that the
arbitration law in India has, despite the stated legislative
purpose to the contrary, envisaged an extensive role for the
20
Décor India Priv. Ltd. v. Nat’l Bldg. Constr. Corp., (2007) 3 ARBLR 348
(India); Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
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courts often coupled with discretion, and this feature is
evident in the legislative provisions and their
interpretation.21 Towards establishing this assertion, the
research within this part attempts to map the arbitration law,
including its historical antecedents, to trace the role of the
courts throughout the lifecycle of the arbitration and at the
time of challenges under Section 34 of the 1996 Act,
especially in determinations related to the time and nature of
the challenges.
The earliest known law on the regulation of
arbitration in colonial India was the Bengal Regulation of
1772.22 The Indian Arbitration Act of 1899—modelled on
the English Arbitration Law—followed and applied within
the Presidency towns of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.23 In
1908, the Civil Procedure Code was revised to include
provisions related to arbitration.24 In 1937, the Arbitration
(Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937 (“1937 Act”) was
enacted to give effect to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the

21

The legislation has identified the role of the courts in India, rather
expansively, in the following aspects: Reference to arbitration (S.8, 45 &54);
Appointment of arbitration (S.11); Interim measures (S.9); Challenge to
arbitrators (S.12, 13 & 14); Challenging the arbitration awards (S.34); Seeking
Courts assistance with regard to Witnesses (S.27); Contempt Proceedings
(S.27); Enforcement of awards (S.36, 49&58); and Appealable orders (S.37 and
S.59). In P. Anand Gajapati Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539 (India) at
541 the SCI held that the 1996 legislation envisaged minimal judicial
intervention in the tribunal’s proceedings. The Court referred to Section 5 of
the legislation - Extent of judicial intervention: "Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by
this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except so provided in this Part".
22
Ben Steinbruck, International Arbitration in India, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 448, (Stephan Balthasar ed.,
2016); Xinyi Shen, India Moves One Step Further Towards “Arbitrationfriendly” Jurisdiction, 11 ARB. L. REV. 266, 267 (2019); Amelia C. Rendeiro,
Indian Arbitration and “Public Policy”, 89 TEX. L. REV. 699, 701 (2011).
23
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 449.
24
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448
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Execution of Foreign Awards of 1927.25 A comprehensive
arbitration law was enacted in 1940, and it substantially
allowed judicial intervention in the arbitral process.26 The
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961
implemented India’s commitment to the 1958 United
Nations New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“NYC”).27 Thus,
the law and practice of arbitration was governed by the
Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) and the Foreign
Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961 (“1961
Act”) which replaced the 1937 Act.28
The 1940 Act allowed multiple opportunities for
litigants to approach the court for intervention during the
lifecycle of the arbitration and after, thus compounding
delays and thereby rendering arbitrations inefficient and
unattractive.29 Courts could be approached to set the
arbitration proceedings in motion.30 The existence of an
agreement and a dispute was required to be proved in court.31
Pending arbitral proceedings, courts could be approached for
an extension of time for making an award.32 Finally, awards
could be enforced only after the courts converted them into
a ruling of their own.33 This has been a singular concern
regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards in India, and its
impact on the arbitration law has sustained despite the
25
A. F. M. Maniruzzama & Ijaz Ali Chishti, International Arbitration and
Public Policy Issues in the Indian Subcontinent: A Look Through the English
Common Law and International Lenses, MANCHESTER J. OF INT’L ECON. L.
(forthcoming).
26
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
27
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
28
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
29
Aloke Ray & Dipen Sabharwal, Indian Arbitration at a Crossroads, WHITE
&
CASE
1,
1
(2007),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/537e8bcbe4b09ac6c31f0ae6/t/53daf516
e4b0e65009ffa151/1406858518409/LM_Arbitration+in+India.pdf.
30
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
31
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
32
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
33
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
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enactment of a new arbitration law, based upon the
UNCITRAL Model Law and much harmonization with the
best practices in this domain.34 As will be discussed in the
foregoing narrative, the role of the courts has placed a
question on the enforceability of the award, despite the law
itself proclaiming that the award ought to be considered at
par with the decree of the court. The 1940 Act dealt with
only domestic arbitration,35 however, there were instances
that the law continued to be applied to foreign arbitral
awards as well: a) an award resulting in an arbitration
agreement between parties one of whom is not a
citizen/corporate of India may provide for an arbitration in
India to be governed by the 1940 Act;36 and b) an award
resulting from a reference to arbitration in a dispute
involving a foreign element could still be decided as per the
1940 Act as reference to arbitration by the trial court was
based on the said legislation and its validity was not open to
any objections.37 These decisions exemplified the enhanced
role of the courts in arbitration—domestic and
international—envisaged within the Indian law prior to
1996.
India ratified the NYC on July 13, 1960, albeit with
the reservation on reciprocity.38 It is interesting to note that
early disputes regarding enforcement in India of U.S.-seated
arbitral awards were decided under common law,39 and not
under the NYC as the United States did not accede to the
NYC until 1971.40 The SCI held awards non-enforceable
34

Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
Harpreet Kaur, The 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act: A Step Toward
Improving Arbitration in India, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 261, 262 (2010).
36
Michel Golodetz v. Serajuddin & Co., AIR 1959 Cal 603 (India); W. Woods
& Son Ltd. v. Bengal Corp., AIR. 1959 Cal 8 (India). The following provisions
of the legislation are applicable: The Arbitration Act, 1940, §§ 14, 17, 31, 32.
37
Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subramaniam Chettiar, AIR 1960 SC 307 (India).
38
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
39
Badat & Co. v. E. India Trading Co., AIR 1964 SC 538 (India).
40
The United States became the thirty-seventh Contracting State through
accession on September 30th, 1970.
35
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except as judgments rendered upon the award.41 It opined,
“[i]f the law of the country in which it was made gives
finality to judgment based upon an award and not to the
award itself, the award can furnish no cause of action for a
suit in India.”42
The 1940 Act also envisaged a significant role for
the courts with regard to decisions on challenges to arbitral
awards—they could be set aside for being “improperly
procured . . . or otherwise invalid”—allowing, therefore, an
interpretational role for the courts including an opportunity
to inquire into the merits of the award43 and extensively
articulated provisions on the jurisdiction of the courts.44
41

Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
Badat & Co. v. E. India Trading Co., AIR 1964 SC 538, 558 (India).
43
The Arbitration Act, 1940, §30.
Grounds for setting aside award. An award shall not be
set aside except on one or more of the following grounds,
namely:(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has
misconducted himself or the proceedings;
(b) that an award has been made after the
issue of an order by the Court superseding the
arbitration or after arbitration proceedings
have become invalid under section 35;
(c) that an award has been improperly
procured or is otherwise invalid.
The Arbitration Act, 1940, §30.
44
The Arbitration Act, 1940, §31.
Jurisdiction.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may
be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to
which the reference relates.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force and save as otherwise
provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity,
effect or existence of an award or an arbitration
agreement between the parties to the agreement or
persons claiming under them shall be decided by the
Court in which the award under the agreement has been,
or may be, filed, and by no other Court.
(3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration
proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings
42
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The 1996 Act,45 guided by the UNCITRAL Model
Law, specifically aimed for speedy and efficacious dispute
resolution mechanisms regarding arbitration and
enforcement of arbitral awards.46 Towards this, the law
addressed the concern against the intervention of courts and
set on the path of course correction.47 Courts continued to
have a role in facilitating arbitration, but importantly, under
the 1996 Act, the arbitral award is now treated as a decree,
and enforceable as such, unlike the 1940 Act that required
an arbitral award to be decreed by the court as final and
binding.48
Part I of the 1996 Act enlisted a few provisions
identifying the role of the court in the context of arbitration
before commencement of the arbitration proceedings.49
Under Section 8, a party to an arbitration agreement or
anyone claiming through such party can apply to the courts
to refer the parties to arbitration unless the court finds that
no valid prima facie arbitration agreement exists.50 The SCI
shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or
may be, filed, and to no other Court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in
this Act or in any other law for the time being in force,
where in any reference any application under this Act has
been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court
alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration
proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out
of that Court and in no other Court.
The Arbitration Act, 1940, §31.
45
The 1996 Act applied to domestic and international arbitration. The
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
46
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
47
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
48
Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448.
49
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
50
Note that this section is significantly different from Section 34 of the 1940
Act that prescribed the following twin conditions for reference to arbitration be
satisfied: (i) that there is sufficient reason for referring the matter to arbitration
in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and (ii) that the applicant was, at
the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still continues to be, ready
and willing to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
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has consistently held that the language of Section 8
is peremptory and it is obligatory for the courts to refer the
parties to arbitration by the terms of their arbitration
agreement,51 unlike the 1940 Act, wherein courts exercised
discretionary powers in this regard.52 In India Household
and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd.,
the SCI emphasized the presumptive validity of an
arbitration clause and held that the courts ought to construe
the arbitration agreement in favor of upholding the same.53
In Hindustan Petroleum Corp. v. Pinkcity Midway
Petroleums, the SCI, articulating upon the civil court’s role,
observed that an objection on the applicability of the
arbitration clause to the dispute should be heard only by the
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the 1996 Act and the
civil court shall not examine the issue through a Section 8
application.54
In relation to arbitration proceedings, parties can
approach the court only: (a) for any interim measure of
protection or injunction or any appointment of receiver
etc.,55 and (b) for the appointment of an arbitrator in the
event a party fails to appoint an arbitrator or such partyappointed arbitrators fail to agree upon the choice of a
chairperson for the tribunal. While handling such requests
for appointment, courts shall confine their examination of
51

P. Anand Gajapati Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539 (India); Konkan
Ry. Corp. v. Rani Constr. Priv. Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 388 (India); Smt. Kalpana
Kothari v. Smt. Sudha Yadav & Orgs., (2002) 1 SCC 203 (India); Sukanya
Holdings Priv. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Anr. (2003) 5 SCC 531 (India);
Magma Leasing & Fin. Ltd. & Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata & Anr. (2009) 10
SCC 103 (India).
52
The Arbitration Act, 1940.
53
India Household & Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household & Healthcare Ltd.,
(2007) 5 SCC 510 (India).
54
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, (2003) 6
SCC 503 (India).
55
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §11, as amended by The
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015—applications for the
same shall be moved before the commercial division in the High Courts, as per
Section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act of 2015.
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the existence of the arbitration agreement to the prereference stage.56
Further, Section 27 of the 1996 Act specifies that
the arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the
tribunal may apply to the court seeking its assistance in
taking evidence.57 However, the Indian law, unlike the
UNCITRAL Model Law, also provides for penalties for
failure to comply with the processes so issued as if they were
orders issued in suits before the courts.58 Courts may either
appoint a commissioner for taking evidence or order that the
evidence be provided directly to the arbitral tribunal.59
AWARDS – ENFORCEMENT AND SETTING ASIDE
APPLICATIONS

Similar to Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, Section 34 of the 1996 Act specified that designated
courts may be approached for applying to set aside arbitral
awards.60 However, the Indian law provided for an
enhanced role of the courts by tweaking the content that
could be ascribed to a public policy exception with local

56

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §11(6A); The Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015; Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India); see
Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd.,
(2019) 6 L.R. 237 (India); WAPCOS Ltd. v. Salma Dam Joint Venture &
Another, (2019) 6 L.R. 247 (India); Union of India v. BM Constr. Co., (2019)
6 L.R. 284 (India).
57
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §27(5).
58
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §27(5).
59
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §§27(3) & (6).
60
See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
[I]n the case of an arbitration other than international
commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High
Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions
forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same
had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include
any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil
Court, or any Court of Small Causes[.]
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §2(1)(e).
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flavor.61 The Law Commission of India expressed disfavor
with judicial intervention through expansive content to
public policy exception, lamenting that courts could at their
discretion pursue enhanced scrutiny of the awards.62
Awards become executable and enforceable after
three months of their receipt,63 by when the time to challenge
them as per Section 34 (1) expires.64 An award-holder
would have to wait for a period of three months following
receipt of the award, and were a Section 34 challenge
application filed by the award-debtor, until it has been
resolved.65 Thus, a bona fide award-holder was prevented

61
See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Interestingly, the earliest
understanding on public policy in arbitration was founded upon a narrow
construction of the curial role of the courts in Renusagar Power Co. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., AIR 1994 SC 860 (1993) (India). However, later jurisprudence
following the enactment of the 1996 Act saw the courts adopting an expansive
content to this exception; see ONGC v. Saw Pipes (2003), 5 SCC 705 (India);
NPCC v. Rajdhani Builders, (2006) (2) ARBLR 219 (Delhi); McDermott Int’l
Inc. v. Burn Standard Co., (2006) 11 SCC 181 (India) (citing with approval
from State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77 (India)); see
generally Fali Nariman, Ten Steps to Salvage Arbitration in India: The First
LGIA-India Arbitration Lecture, 27(2) ARB. INT’L 115 (2011); Daniel Mathew,
Situating Public Policy in the Indian Arbitration Paradigm: Pursuing the
Elusive Balance 3(1) J. OF NAT’L L. UNIV. 105 (2015); JUSTICE R.S.
BACHAWAT, LAW OF ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION, 1 (6th ed. 2017).
62
LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 246 AMENDMENTS TO THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 (2014); LAW COMMISSION OF
INDIA, SUPPLEMENTARY TO REPORT NO. 246 TO ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 (2015).
63
Courts retain the power to extend this period by another 30 days upon
satisfaction of the reasons for delay. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, §34(3).
64
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3).
65
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
Application for setting aside arbitral award—
(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be
made only by an application for setting aside such award
in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only
if—
(a) the party making the application furnishes
proof that—
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(i) a party was under some
incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is
not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon,
under the law for the time being in
force; or
(iii) the party making the
application was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an
arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with
a dispute not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted,
only that part of the arbitral award which contains
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be
set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, unless such
agreement was in conflict with a provision of
this Part from which the parties cannot
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that—
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public
policy of India, only if,—
(i) the making of the award was induced or
affected by fraud or corruption or was in
violation of section 75 or section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law; or
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from reaping the fruits of the arbitral award because of
an "automatic stay" on proceedings for execution of the

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic
notions of morality or justice. [(inserted by
2015 Amendment Act)]
Explanation 2—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the
merits of the dispute. [(inserted by 2015 Amendment
Act)]
(2A) An arbitral award arising out of
arbitrations
other
than
international
commercial arbitrations, may also be set
aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the
award is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award: Provided
that an award shall not be set aside merely on
the ground of an erroneous application of the
law or by reappreciation of evidence.
[(inserted by 2015 Amendment Act)]
(3) An application for setting aside may not
be made after three months have elapsed
from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award
or, if a request had been made under section
33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the said
period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter.
(4) On receipt of an application under subsection (1), the Court may, where it is
appropriate and it is so requested by a party,
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time
determined by it in order to give the arbitral
tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral
proceedings or to take such other action as in
the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate
the grounds for setting aside the arbitral
award.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
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award on account of the losing party filing a setting aside
application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.66
Section 36 of the amended 2015 Act addresses the
impact of Section 34 on the enforceability of the award; the
party challenging an award shall apply separately for stay on
execution.67 Courts—as per the amended Section 36(2) and
(3)—shall exercise discretion to order a stay of execution
and prescribe the conditions for its operation.68 Section 26
of the 2015 Act expressly provides that the Act would apply
to arbitral proceedings which commence on or after the date
of commencement of the 2015 Amendment; i.e., October 23,
2015 ("Cut-Off Date").69 An automatic stay remained
operative on the enforcement of all arbitral awards in cases

66

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.
(1) Where the time for making an application to set aside
the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award
shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner
as if it were a decree of the court.
(2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award
has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of
such an application shall not by itself render that award
unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay
of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance
with the provisions of sub-section (3), on a separate
application made for that purpose.
(3) Upon filing of an application under sub-section (2)
for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court
may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, grant
stay of the operation of such award for reasons to be
recorded in writing:
Provided that the Court shall, while considering the
application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral
award for payment of money, have due regard to the
provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.
68
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36(2–3).
69
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §26.
67
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where a petition under Section 34 of the 2015 Act was
pending as of the Cut-Off Date.70
Pertinently, the issue of retrospective application of
the 2015 amendment was discussed within the Justice
Applauding the
Srikrishna Committee’s Report.71
amendment for ushering changes that minimize judicial
intervention in the arbitral process through, among others,
an amendment to Section 36, the Report observed that
removal of automatic stay of the award helps prevent parties
from engaging in dilatory tactics through unnecessary
involvement of the courts.72 However, it was aware of the
detrimental impact that the continued confusion regarding
the retrospective applicability the amended 2015 Act could
foster.73 It recommended that the applicability of Section 26
of the 2015 Act be limited to arbitrations commenced on or
after the Cut-Off Date and related court proceedings.74
On at least two occasions, higher judiciary in India
has attempted to articulate on the applicability of Section 26
of the 2015 Act.75 In Ardee Infrastructure v. Anuradha
Bhatia, the Delhi High Court held Section 26 is applicable
only to those arbitral proceedings which were initiated after
the commencement of the amendment and to court
proceedings arising out of them.76 The Court reasoned that
the right to have an award enforced included the negative
70
Khaitan & Co, Arbitral Awards- Automatic Stays, On? And Casus Omissus
(December
24,
2019),
for
IBC,
LEXOLOGY
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=64bce580-f3ee-4df5-98062b8106952f52.
71
See JUSTICE B.N. SRIKRISHNA, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE TO
REVIEW THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF ARBITRATION MECHANISM IN INDIA,
(2017).
72
SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 21.
73
SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 23.
74
SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 61–62.
75
See Ardee Infrastructure Priv. Ltd. v. Anuradha Bhatia, 2017 (2) ARBLR 163
(Delhi); Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Board of Control for Cricket in India, 2017
(2) Bom CR 113 (India).
76
Ardee Infrastructure Priv. Ltd. v. Anuradha Bhatia, 2017 (2) ArbLR 163
(Delhi).
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right to not have it enforced until challenges or objections to
the same were disposed.77 Section 34 of the 1996 Act thus
created a vested right for automatic stay of the award for
parties to an arbitral proceeding which commenced before
the 2015 Act pending a decision on challenge to the award.78
The Bombay High Court differed though.79 In Kochi Cricket
Private Ltd. vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India,80 a
challenge to the award was filed before the commencement
of the 2015 Act but the execution application for the award
was filed after the commencement of the 2015 Act.81 The
appellants challenged the execution application by applying
the un-amended Section 36 to the facts and pleaded for an
automatic stay on the award.82 However, the Single Judge
ruled that the amended Section 36 would apply, thus there
would be no automatic stay, and ordered execution.83
The SCI addressed the question of interpretation of
Section 26 of the 2015 Act and its applicability to the
proceedings pending prior to such amendment in Board of
Control for Cricket in India vs. Kochi Cricket Private Ltd.
(“BCCI”), a set of appeals that included an appeal from the
abovementioned Bombay High Court decision.84
Characterising Section 36 of the 1996 Act as a procedural
77
Ardee Infrastructure Priv. Ltd. v. Anuradha Bhatia, 2017 (2) ArbLR 163
(Delhi).
78
See Muskan Arora, Indian Supreme Court Strikes Down Automatic Stay
Provisions for Good, WOLTERS KLUWER (February 15, 2020),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/02/15/indian-supremecourt-strikes-down-automatic-stay-provisions-for-good/.
79
Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2)
BomCR 113 (India).
80 Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2) BomCR
113 (India).
81
Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2)
BomCR 113 (India).
82
Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2)
BomCR 113 (India).
83
Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2)
BomCR 113 (India).
84
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
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provision, the Court held that an award-debtor cannot enjoy
the substantive vested right of an automatic stay on the
execution of an arbitral award upon filing a setting aside
petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.85 The Supreme
Court also observed that the phrase "has been" in subsection
two of Section 36 referred to petitions filed under Section 34
of the 1996 Act before the Cut-Off Date.86 The Court further
clarified that the substituted Section 36 would apply to
arbitral awards in cases where a petition under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act has already been filed as of the Cut-Off Date.87
The 1996 Act was further amended in 2019 to
regulate its application based upon the timeline of the
arbitral proceedings and the proceedings in the court based
upon the arbitration.88 Section 87, inserted through the 2019
Act, provided that the 2015 amendment applied only to the
arbitral proceedings that commenced on or after the Cut-Off
Date and to such court proceedings that emanate from such
arbitral proceedings.89 Moreover, Section 15 of the 2019
Act deleted Section 26 of the 2015 Act.90 The insertion thus
85

Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
86
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
87
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
88
See Subhiksh Vasudev, The 2019 amendment to the Indian Arbitration Act:
A classic case of one step forward two steps backward?, WOLTERS KLUWER
(August
25,
2019),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/25/the-2019-amendmentto-the-indian-arbitration-act-a-classic-case-of-one-step-forward-two-stepsbackward/.
89
Shaneen Parikh & Shalaka Patil, The Saga Continues in 2019- Applicability
of the 2015 Amendments in light of the 2019 Amendments., CYRIL AMARCHAND
MANGALDAS
(August
28,
2019),
https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2019/08/applicability-of-the-2015amendments-2019-amendments-arbitration-conciliation/.
90
Padmaja Kaul & Yugank Goel, Aman Chaudhary, India: The Supreme Court
Strikes Down Section 87 Of The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 –
Reinstates BCCI v. Kochi Cricket, MONDAQ (December 11, 2019),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appeals-compensation/873536/the-
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resulted in nullifying the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in BCCI by restoring the pre-2015 amendment
position: automatic stay on execution of awards for set-aside
applications filed under Section 34 before the Cut-Off
Date.91 The following section discusses the delineation of
the SCI in the HCC dictum wherein it addressed the
constitutionality-related challenges to Section 87 of the 2019
Act and the status of the stay vis-à-vis the arbitral award.92
II. THE TWO-CHERRY DOCTRINE VIS-À-VIS THE
INDIAN ARBITRATION ACT, 1996:
One of the crucial aspects of the HCC judgment, in
the view of the authors, was the discussion revolving around
the two-cherry doctrine wherein the SCI engaged in an
incisive comparative analysis of the enforcement procedure
and finality of arbitral awards.93 The enforcement procedure
relating to domestic awards under the 1996 Act, unlike the
1940 Act, enunciates that an arbitral award shall be enforced
under the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 (“1908 CPC”) in the
same manner as if it were a decree of the Court.94 Further,
in Section 36 of the 1996 Act, unlike in the 1940 Act, an
obligation is cast upon the enforcing party to satisfy the court
that “what is sought to be executed is an award[,]” and that
supreme-court-strikes-down-section-87-of-the-arbitration-and-conciliationact-1996--reinstates-bcci-v-kochi-cricket.
91
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
92
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
93
See Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
94
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.
Where the time for making an application to set aside the
arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such
application having been made, it has been refused, the
award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it
were a decree of the Court.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36. Also, for a
comparative understanding of section 36 as per the 2015
amendment, see Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket
Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 1549 (India).
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the same satisfies other legal requirements such as
registration, impleading of necessary parties, etcetera.95
The SCI observed that Articles 34 and 3596 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law postulated for two bites at the
cherry: (i) during setting aside applications,97 and (ii) during
recognition and enforcement applications.98 In comparison,
as per the SCI, Section 35 and Section 36 of the 1996 Act do
not follow the two-cherry doctrine.99 When an award is
made in India, it automatically becomes final and binding as
a decree under the 1908 CPC, thereby rendering no recourse
when it comes to recognition and enforcement.100 The court
explained that such deviation was necessary to ensure that
when the time limit for making an application elapses or
such an application is rejected, the award shall be enforced

95

Diddi Kumaraswamy v. Pathakala Bhaskar, (2008) 2 ArbLR 573. In the
instant case the existence of an arbitration agreement was not evidenced; the
award which was dealing with transfer of immovable property was not on
stamped paper.
96
UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L ARB. ARTICLE 35 (UNITED NATIONS 1985).
(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in
which it was made, shall be recognized as binding and,
upon application in writing to the competent court, shall
be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and
of Article 36.
(2) The party relying on an award or applying for its
enforcement shall supply the duly authenticated original
award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the original
arbitration agreement referred to in Article 7 or a duly
certified copy thereof. If the award or agreement is not
made in an official language of this State, the party shall
supply a duly certified translation thereof into such
language.
UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L ARB. ARTICLE 35 (UNITED NATIONS 1985).
97
One of the grounds for refusal to recognize foreign awards is when the award
is not binding.
98
Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
99
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §35. “Subject to this Part an
arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming
under them respectively.” The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §35.
100
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, §33; The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, §9.
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under the 1908 CPC as if it were a decree of the court.101
The authors agree with the SCI in its observation that the
1996 Act has not followed the framework stipulated in the
UNCITRAL Model Law.102 Section 36 of the 1996 Act
provides for a more robust enforcement regime similar to the
German ZPO103 and Japanese Arbitration Law.104
A perusal of the travaux préparatories of the
UNCITRAL Model Law pertaining to the term “binding”105
indicates that the Secretariat suggested two proposals viz.:
(i) introduction of the term “between the parties” to signify
that the award cannot bind other persons;106 and (ii)
specifying the exact point in time when an award shall be
recognized as binding.107 However, the Working Group
declined to heed to the abovementioned suggestions on
grounds that “there was no need for express statements” on
these points.108 Subsequently, the Secretariat, in its
101

Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1055. Section 1055
of the German ZPO states that the arbitral award has the same effect between
the parties as a final and binding court judgment. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO]
[Code of Civil Procedure], § 1055; see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1113–87 (2d ed. 2014).
104
[Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 45, para. 1 (Japan). Article
45(1) of the Japanese Arbitration Law states that “[a]n arbitral award
(irrespective of whether or not the place of arbitration is in the territory of Japan
. . . ) shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment.” See also
BORN, supra note 103.
105
Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the
Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17, at 36, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/246 (1984). Pursuant to much discussion and a proposal by the Soviet
Union, it was decided that for foreign awards, the point in time when the award
becomes binding is governed by the law under which the award was made.
106
HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 1006–52 (1st ed. 1989).
107
HOLTZMANN & NEHAUS, supra note 106; see also Studies and Reports on
Specific Subjects, [1983] 14 Y.B. Int’l Trade L. 92, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 (“not yet . . . binding” in Article V(1)(e) of the NYC is
commonly interpreted as meaning “still open to ordinary means of recourse”).
108
U.N. GAOR, supra note 105, at 36.
102
103
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commentary on the Working Group’s draft, interpreted the
above term to connote that even though not expressly stated,
an award is binding between the parties and from the date of
the award.109 Pertinently, a subtle difference highlighted
when comparing Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
and the NYC, according to the authors, is the useful
distinction drawn between enforcement and recognition.110
Even though the essence of Article 35 was modelled on the
parallel requirements of the NYC, sub-clause one of Article
35 makes it clear that recognition may occur independently
of enforcement and it is only for the purposes of enforcing
an award that a separate application may be made.111
Further, the Working Group explained that
recognition was an abstract legal effect which could be
obtained automatically without necessarily being requested
by a party.112 The authors are of the opinion that domestic
arbitral legislations commonly provide that the award
obtains its executory force by an “exequatur,”113 although
the procedure may vary from one state to the other. From a
comparative standpoint, in international practice, if an
arbitral award is not vacated, the award creditor will seek
enforcement of the award which will probably involve
commencing legal proceedings under local laws of the state
where the award is sought to be enforced.114 Often,
however, an award must be “confirmed” by a local court in
109

Analytical Commentary on the Draft Text of a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18, at 76, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/264, (1985).
110
U.N. GAOR, supra note 108.
111
U.N. GAOR, supra note 105, at 35.
112
U.N. GAOR, supra note 105, at 35.
113
“Exequatur” refers to court-granted leave to enforce an arbitral award.
“Double-exequatur” refers to the procedure whereby leave to enforce an arbitral
award might have to be obtained both in the state where it was made along with
the state where enforcement was sought; see also HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS,
supra note 106, at 1006–52.
114
HOLTZMANN & NEHAUS, supra note 106.
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a particular forum before it may be coercively enforced in
that forum.115 Pursuant to such confirmation, an award may
be “recognized” through judicial proceedings.116
The significance of the absence of the two-cherry
doctrine in India is highlighted by the fact that premising
itself on the above, the court declared the ratio of NALCO117
and Fiza Developers v. AMCI118 as per incuriam for its
failure to take into due consideration Section 9, Section 35,
and the second part of Section 36 of the 1996 Act and
declaring the law incorrectly. The authors are of the view
that the SCI noting the interplay of these statutory provisions
heralded the removal of the automatic stay feature in India’s
arbitration law.119 Following an extensive analysis of these
provisions and their legislative intent, the SCI observed that
the assumption of non-executability of an award owing to a
challenge under Section 34 was “plainly incorrect.”120 In
relation to the nature of Section 36, the SCI remarked that
“the amended Section, being clarificatory in nature merely
restates the position that the unamended Section 36 does not
stand in the way of the law as to grant of stay of a money
decree under the provisions of the CPC, 1908.”121
According to SCI, Section 36 did not in any way
infer an automatic stay on the enforcement of awards.122
Such an interpretation, as per SCI, is also consistent with the
fundamental tenets enshrined in Section 9 of the 1996 Act,
which enables a party to apply to a court for relief “after the
115

BORN, supra note 103, at 703–78.
BORN, supra note 103, at 59.
Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC
540 (India).
118
Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India).
119
Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India).
120
Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC
540 (India) or Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India).
121
Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India).
122
Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC
540 (India) or Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India).
116
117
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making of the arbitration award but before it is enforced in
accordance with Section 36.”123
To reinforce this
observation, it relied upon the ratio in Dirk India Private Ltd
vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co.:
12. The second facet of Section 9 is the
proximate nexus between the orders that
are sought and the arbitral proceedings.
When an interim measure of protection is
sought before or during arbitral
proceedings, such a measure is a step[-]in
aid to the fruition of the arbitral
proceedings. When sought after an arbitral
award is made but before it is enforced, the
measure of protection is intended to
safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until
the eventual enforcement of the award.
Here again the measure of protection is a
step[-]in aid of enforcement. It is intended
to ensure that enforcement of the award
results in a realisable claim and that the
award is not rendered illusory by dealings
that would put the subject of the award
beyond the pale of enforcement.124
The court observed that the stated purpose of Section
36 was for a different, well-illustrated purpose in Leela
Hotels vs. Housing and Urban Development Corp.:
45. Regarding the question as to whether
the award of the learned arbitrator
tantamounts to a decree or not, the
language used in Section 36 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
makes it very clear that such an award has
123

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9.
Dirk India Priv. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7)
Bom CR 493 (India).
124
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to be enforced under the Code of Civil
Procedure in the same manner as it were a
decree of the court. The said language
leaves no room for doubt as to the manner
in which the award of the learned arbitrator
was to be accepted.125
In BCCI,126 the SCI specifically addressed the status
of Section 34 petitions filed before the commencement of the
2015 Act, i.e. the veritable interpretation of Section 26 of the
2015 Act.127 The court deliberated on whether the
Amendments introduced by the 2015 Act applied to court
proceedings arising out of arbitrations that were initiated
before the Cut-Off Date. In response, it attempted to
ascertain the constituent elements of “enforcement” under
the 1996 Act.128 It opined that the legislation stated an award
be deemed a decree of the court and is enforceable as such
under provisions of Order XXI and Order LXI, Rule 5 of the
1908 CPC.129
The Court’s response to the moot question – the
applicability of Section 26 of the Act, 2015 to Section 34
petitions – can be summarized as:

125

Leela Hotels v. Hous. & Urb. Dev. Co., (2012) 1 SCC 302 (India); see also
Vipul Aggarwal v. Atul Kanodia & Co., AIR 2004 All 205 (India), wherein the
Petitioner contended that pending disposal of his appeal, the Award was not
final and hence could not be enforced. The High Court opined that since stay
was not granted by the SCI, the execution should proceed as there is no
automatic stay due to pendency of the appeal.
126
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India). (This was a pre-Amendment, 2019 decision of the SCI.).
127
See generally Canara Nidhi Ltd. v. M. Shashikala, AIR 2019 SC 4544 (India)
(holding that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is a
summary proceeding not in the nature of a regular suit).
128
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India). (This was a pre-2019 Act decision of the SCI.).
129
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).

221

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021

27

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]

The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

(a) The amended 2015 Act would apply to arbitral
proceedings commenced on or after the Cut-Off
Date mentioned therein;
(b) The amended 2015 Act would apply to court
proceedings arising out of arbitrations filed on or
after the Cut-Off Date, even where the arbitral
proceedings were commenced before the
amendments came into force; and
(c) The amended 2015 Act would apply to
applications pending on the Cut-Off Date.130
The Court further clarified,
[s]ince it is clear that execution
of a decree pertains to the realm
of procedure, and that there is
no substantive vested right in a
judgment debtor to resist
execution, Section 36, as
substituted, would apply even to
pending Section 34 applications
on the date of commencement
of the Amendment Act.131
Further, the SCI bifurcated arbitral proceedings and
court proceedings arising out of arbitral proceedings and
observed that court-related proceedings cannot be construed
as a continuation of arbitral proceedings but would be
viewed separately.132 The Court also recommended the
legislature take note of the 1996 Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Act while implementing the proposed Section
87 indicated in the Government’s press release dated July 3,

130

Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
131
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
132
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
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2018.133 It cautioned against amendments that could undo
the positive changes ushered in by the 2015 Act and result in
unwarranted interference by courts that could defeat the
objects of the 1996 Act.134
Following the decision in the BCCI case and the
subsequent changes ushered by the 2019 Act, the SCI’s
decision in the HCC case assumed significance for the
arbitral jurisprudence of India.135 The 2019 Act, via Section
13, introduced Section 87:
87. Unless the parties otherwise
agree, the amendments made to
this Act by the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2015 shall(a) not apply to(i) arbitral proceedings
commenced before the
commencement of the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
(Amendment)
Act,
2015;
(ii) court proceedings
arising out of or in
relation to such arbitral
proceedings
irrespective of whether
such court proceedings
are commenced prior
133

Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
134
Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
135
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019; Hindustan
Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).; Bd. of Control for
Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 1549 (India).
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to
or
after
the
commencement of the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
(Amendment)
Act,
2015;
(b) apply only to arbitral
proceedings commenced on
or after the commencement
of the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment)
Act, 2015 and to court
proceedings arising out of
or in relation to such
arbitral proceedings.136
Further, Section 15 of the 2019 Act omitted Section
26 of the 2015 Act:137
15. Section 26 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation (Amendment)
Act, 2015 shall be omitted and
shall be deemed to have been
omitted with effect from the
23rd October, 2015.138
136

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §87(a–b).
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §15.
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral
proceedings commenced, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the
commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise
agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral
proceedings commenced on or after the date of
commencement of this Act.
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §26.
138
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §15.
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral
proceedings commenced, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the
commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise
agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral
137
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Observing that it was aware of the
recommendations of the Srikrishna Committee Report,139
the SCI noted the impact of Section 87 stated herein below:
78. The immediate effect of the
proposed Section 87 would be
to put all the important
amendments made by the
Amendment Act on a backburner, such as the important
amendments made to Sections
28 and 34 in particular, which,
as has been stated by the
Statement of Objects and
Reasons “. . . have resulted in
delay of disposal of arbitration
proceedings and increase in
interference of courts in
arbitration matters, which tend
to defeat the object of the Act,”
and will now not be applicable
to Section 34 petitions filed
after 23-10-2015, but will be
applicable to Section 34
petitions filed in cases where
arbitration proceedings have
themselves commenced only
after 23-10-2015. This would
mean that in all matters which
are in the pipeline, despite the
fact that Section 34 proceedings
have been initiated only after
proceedings commenced on or after the date of
commencement of this Act.
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §26.
139
SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71.
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23-10-2015, yet, the old law
would continue to apply
resulting in delay of disposal of
arbitration proceedings by
increased interference of courts,
which ultimately defeats the
object of the 1996 Act . . . It can
thus be seen that the scheme of
Section 87 is different from that
of Section 26, and is explicit in
stating that court proceedings
are merely parasitical on arbitral
proceedings.140
In light of this, the SCI opined that the “mischief of
misconstruction” of Section 36 of the 1996 Act, which was
corrected by legislative intervention in 2015, would be
undone by the “retrospective resurrection” of an automatic
stay that was antithetical to the object and reasons of the
1996 Act.141
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE 2019
AMENDMENT ACT, 2019
Before the enactment of the 2015 Act, the filing of
an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act would
automatically stay execution proceedings of an award under
Section 36 of the 1996 Act.142 The 2015 Act removed this
automatic stay and mandated the filing of a separate
application to seek a stay on the execution proceedings.143
The aforesaid application, per Section 19 of the 2015 Act,
required a deposit to be made and would be only granted at
the discretion of the courts.144
The BCCI ratio specified that the amended
provisions of Section 36 of the 1996 Act were applicable to
140

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
142
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(1–6).
143
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §19(2).
144
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §19(2–3).
141
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pending arbitration proceedings.145 As such, irrespective of
the commencement of arbitration before the amendments
were enacted, no automatic stay will apply to court
proceedings arising out of such arbitrations even if such
court proceedings are filed after the Cut-Off Date.146 The
date, definitive for the operation of the 2015 Amendment,
nevertheless signified the date of the 2015 Act coming into
force and nothing more.147
Notably, Section 87 of the 2019 Act prescribed two
timelines, retrospectively effective from the Cut-Off Date
viz.: (i) arbitral proceedings and court proceedings arising
out of such arbitral proceedings initiated before the Cut-Off
Date and (ii) arbitral proceedings and court proceedings
arising out of such arbitral proceedings initiated on or after
the Cut-Off Date.148 Section 87 of the 2019 Act thus
resurrected the “automatic stay,” which was removed by the
amendments introduced by the 2015 Act.149
In HCC, the SCI examined the constitutional
validity of Section 87 introduced into the 1996 Act by the
2019 Act, and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Act as
against well-established principles envisaged in the
constitutional jurisprudence of India.150 The fulcrum of the
arguments on constitutionality rested upon Articles 14,
19(1), 21, and 300-A of the 1950 Constitution.151
The Petitioners (Appellants) contended that Section
87 of the 2019 Act was violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21,
and 300-A of the 1950 Constitution, as:

145

Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
146
See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.
147
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.
148
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §87.
149
See The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.
150
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
151
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
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(i)

it defeated the purposes and objectives of
the Act, 1996;
(ii)
operate[s] against the award creditor’s
right to enforce the arbitral award;
(iii)
undermines the binding nature of an
arbitral award; and
(iv)
operates against the ratio laid down in the
BCCI and is therefore unreasonable,
excessive,
disproportionate,
and
arbitrary.152
The Petitioners further contended that in a situation
where an award-creditor is unable to enforce the award on
account of the automatic stay, it could possibly lead to
absurd situations, exemplified in the situation in the HCC
case.153 To reinforce their argument, the Petitioners also
attempted to highlight an anomaly in the retrospective
resurrection of the automatic stay by arguing that the same
allows a window of opportunity for award-debtors to claim
refunds of monies already paid to an award holder pending
application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.154
Per contra, the thrust of Respondents’ argument was
that merely signifying a cut-off date in the 2019 Act155
cannot be considered to be violating the Constitution as it is
Parliament’s prerogative to fix such a cut-off date and courts
cannot interfere in policy matters.156 The Attorney General
for India, defending the repeal of Section 26 of the 2015 Act
152

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). The
petitioners alluded to the financial difficulties faced by the award-holder yet
unable to make payments due leading to actions under the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code of 2016. Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020
SC 122 (India).
154
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
155
The effective cut-off date in the present context is October 23, 2015.
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
156
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India); UOI v.
Parameswaran Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305, ¶ 102 (India); Govt. of A.P.
v. N. Subbarayudu, (2008) 14 SCC 702 (India).
153
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and the insertion of Section 87 of the 2019 Act, referred to
BCCI to argue that interpretation of Section 26 of the 2015
Act was merely declaratory in nature.157 Further, the
Respondents averred that since BCCI does not set aside any
executive action, “nor any provision of statute, it does not
require a validating act to neutralize its effect.”158 They
argued that Parliament retained the power to clarify the
legislative intent were it to find that the SCI’s ratio did not
reflect the same.159 They further argued that identifying the
definitive date of enforcement remained within the exclusive
domain of the Parliament.160
The Court prefaced its analysis with a verbatim
reference to the Srikrishna Committee Report’s
recommendation on the introduction of Section 87:161
However, Section 26 has remained
silent on the applicability of the
2015 amendment Act to court
proceedings, both pending and
newly initiated in case of
arbitrations commenced prior to 23
October 2015.
Different High
Courts in India have taken divergent
views on the applicability of the
2015 Amendment Act to such court
proceedings. Broadly, there are
three sets of views as summarised
below:
(a) The 2015 Amendment Act is
not
applicable
to
court
proceedings (fresh and pending)
157

Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC
1549 (India).
158
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
159
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
160
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
161
SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 60–61.
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where the arbitral proceedings
to which they relate commenced
before 23 October 2015.
(b) The first part of Section 26
is narrower than the second and
only
excludes
arbitral
proceedings commenced prior
to 23 October 2015 from the
application of the 2015
Amendment Act. The 2015
Amendment
Act
would,
however, apply to fresh or
pending court proceedings in
relation to arbitral proceedings
commenced prior to 23 October
2015.
(c) The wording “arbitral
proceedings” in Section 26
cannot be construed to include
related court proceedings.
Accordingly,
the
2015
Amendment Act applied to all
arbitrations commenced on or
after 23 October 2015. As far as
court
proceedings
are
concerned,
the
2015
Amendment Act would apply to
all court proceedings from 23
October 2015, including fresh
or pending court proceedings in
relation
to
arbitration
commenced before, on or after
23 October 2015.162
Thus, it is evident that there is considerable
confusion regarding the applicability of the
162

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
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2015 Amendment Act to related court
proceedings in arbitration commenced
before October 23, 2015. The Committee
is of the view that a suitable legislative
amendment is required to address this
issue. . . . Therefore, it is felt that it may be
desirable to limit the applicability of the
2015 Amendment Act to arbitration
commenced on or after 23 October 2015
and related court proceedings.163
The SCI adopted a three-pronged approach to address the
averments of the Parties.164 In the first prong of its analysis,
the Court observed that Section 34 of the 1996 Act envisaged
summary proceedings in the court.165 The result, in essence,
is that courts do not sit on an appeal while hearing the
causae.166 Such being the case, the SCI remarked that an
anomaly occurs upon insertion of Section 87 into the 1996
Act.167 The anomaly that the Court was referring to was
Order XLI Rule 5 of the 1908 CPC.168 This Order stipulates
163

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 181 (India); see
also Ssangyong Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. NHAI, AIR 2019 SC 504, 563 (India)
(holding that after the 2015 Act, the SCI cannot interfere with an arbitral award
on merits).
166
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India); see also
Associated Constr. v. Pawanhans Helicopters Ltd., 16 SCC 128, 153 (2008)
(India) (holding that a court reviewing an arbitral award under Section 34 does
not sit in appeal over the award, and if the view taken by the arbitrator is
possible, no interference is called for).
167
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
168
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India); Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 5:
(1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings
under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the
Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree
be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been
preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for
sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree.
[Explanation—An order by the Appellate Court for the stay
of execution of the decree shall be effective from the date
164
165
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that merely filing an appeal from a decree does not act as an
automatic stay.169 Rather, to obtain a stay the party has to
file an application seeking the discretion of the appellate
courts.170 In comparison, the insertion of Section 87 of the
2019 Act ensured that arbitral awards are subject to a
different rule and threshold than the rule stipulated in Order
XLI Rule 5.171 This is due to the invocation of an automatic
stay when an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act

of the communication of such order to the Court of first
instance, but an affidavit sworn by the appellant, based on
his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of
execution of the decree has been made by the Appellate
Court shall, pending the receipt from the Appellate Court
of the order for the stay of execution or any order to the
contrary, be acted upon by the Court of first instance.].
(2) Stay by Court which passed the decree-Where an
application is made for stay of execution of an appealable
decree before the expiration of the time allowed for
appealing therefrom, the Court which passed the decree
may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution
to be stayed.
(3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is
satisfied(a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for
stay of execution unless the order is made;
(b) that the application has been made without
unreasonable delay; and
(c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due
performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be
binding upon him.
[(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3)], the Court
may make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending
the hearing of the application.
[(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or
furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of rule 1, the
Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the
decree.].
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 5
169
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 4.
170
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 4.
171
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
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has been filed.172 The juxtaposition between Order XLI Rule
5 of the 1908 CPC and Section 87 of the 2019 Act—which
the Court attempted to highlight—is encapsulated in the
proviso of Section 36 of the 2015 Act.173 This section
stipulates that the Court, “when considering an application
for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment
of money, [will] have due regard to the provisions for grant
of stay of a money decree under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.”174 Thus, according to the SCI, the aforesaid anomaly
makes Section 87 manifestly arbitrary to Article 14 of the
1950 Constitution, so it was therefore liable to be struck
down.175 Notably, the SCI observed “when the mischief of
the misconstruction of Section 36 was corrected after a
period of more than [nineteen] years by legislative
intervention in 2015, to now work in the reverse direction
and bring back the aforesaid mischief itself results in
manifest arbitrariness.”176 The Court therefore held that the
legislature, by its failure to duly note the development of law
on the issue of automatic stay and amending the law in
complete disregard of the legal jurisprudence developed by
the 2015 Act—especially BCCI—had acted in contravention
to the objects and purposes of the 1996 Act.177 The Court
observed that the legislature, before pursuing the amendment
leading to the insertion, could have drawn insights from
BCCI—which had alerted against the introduction of Section
87 and did not urge reliance upon the Srikrishna Committee
172

Singh & Associates, Automatic Stay of Enforcement Of The Arbitration
Award Upon Admission of Challenge Under Section 34 Of The Arbitration And
Conciliation
Act,
MONDAQ
(Feb.
11,
2020),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appealscompensation/880262/automatic-stay-of-enforcement-of-the-arbitral-awardupon-admission-of-challenge-under-section-34-of-the-arbitration-andconciliation-act.
173
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
174
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 160 (India).
175
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India).
176
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India).
177
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
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Report.178 The Court noted that said amendment to the 1996
Act could lead to excessive judicial interference, and
therefore was unreasonable, arbitrary, and against public
interest.179
In its second prong of the analysis, the SCI stated
that Section 87 of the 2019 Act does not consider the
implications and economic hardships imposed upon an
award holder under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of
2016.180 Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, award
creditors are unable to recover operational debts under an
award owing to the operation of automatic stay, thereby
having to bear the brunt of an insolvency application from
their creditors.181 Accordingly, the SCI summed up its
above observations by holding that Section 87 of the 1996
Act violated Article 14 of the 1950 Constitution because it
imposed unwarranted economic hardships on the award
creditor and resurrected a window for judicial
interference.182
In its last prong of the analysis, the SCI held that all
of the Respondent’s averments that were directed towards
fixing the Cut-Off Date were misguided because the date
was merely the point in time in which the 2015 Act came
into force.183
Instead, the non-bifurcation of Court
proceedings and arbitration proceedings with reference to
the date of October 23, 2015—the date on which the 2015
Act was brought into force—is manifestly arbitrary as it
unduly results in putting the positive changes introduced by
the 2015 Act on a “backburner.”184
The application of constitutional principles to
various facets of arbitration has assumed significance
178

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 128, 180 (India).
180
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 183 (India).
181
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 183 (India).
182
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 183–84 (India).
183
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 185 (India).
184
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India).
179
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because emerging trends suggest that courts have not
hesitated in resorting to the usage of constitutional principles
to protect public interest and ensure the effective
implementation of the aims and objectives of the 1996
Act.185 For example, in Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State
Water Supply, the arbitration clause186 stipulated a predeposit of ten percent of the amount claimed until the
announcement of the award with the goal of reducing
frivolous claims.187 The clause further postulated that in the
185

Mohammad Kamran, Ashish Kabra, & Vyapak Desai, Return of the Jedi:
Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 87 of the Arbitration Act, NISHITH DESAI
ASSOCIATES (Dec. 5, 2019), http://nishithdesai.com/information/newsstorage/news-details/article/return-of-the-jedi-supreme-court-strikes-downsection-87-of-the-arbitration-act.html.
186
Clause 25(viii) of the contract, which entailed the arbitration clause is as
follows:
It shall be an essential term of this contract that in order
to avoid frivolous claims the party invoking arbitration
shall specify the dispute based on facts and calculations
stating the amount claimed under each claim and shall
furnish a "deposit-at-call" for ten percent of the amount
claimed, on a Schedule bank in the name of the
Arbitrator by his official designation who shall keep the
amount in deposit till the announcement of the award. In
the event of an award in favour of the claimant, the
deposit shall be refunded to him in proportion to the
amount awarded w.r.t. the amount claimed and the
balance, if any, shall be forfeited and paid to the other
party.
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359, 363 (SC) (India).
187
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359 (SC) (India). The arbitration clause Clause 25(viii) states:
viii. It shall be an essential term of this contract that in
order to avoid frivolous claims the party invoking
arbitration shall specify the dispute based on facts and
calculations stating the amount claimed under each claim
and shall furnish a "deposit-at-call" for ten percent of the
amount claimed, on a Schedule bank in the name of the
Arbitrator by his official designation who shall keep the
amount in deposit till the announcement of the award. In
the event of an award in favour of the claimant, the
deposit shall be refunded to him in proportion to the
amount awarded w.r.t. the amount claimed and the
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event of a favorable award, the deposit made before the
commencement of arbitration would be refunded in the
proportion of the amount awarded, and the remaining
balance would be forfeited and paid to the other party.188 On
appeal, the SCI held that the requirement of a pre-deposit
was without any direct nexus to the filing of frivolous
claims, as the pre-deposit was to be paid at the threshold
before commencing arbitration proceedings.189 In light of
the aforesaid, the Court remarked that the arbitral clause in
the contract was not only arbitrary under Article 14 of the
1950 Constitution, but it was also unfair and unjust, as there
existed no discernible way for the law to ascertain whether a
claim was frivolous or not.190 The terminology employed in
the arbitration clause of the contract, according to the SCI,
not only failed to align with the aims and objectives of the
1996 Act, but also rendered the entire clause arbitrary as it
was not only excessive, but also invariably led to an unjust
result.191
Therefore, for the reasons enumerated above, the
SCI ultimately held that the ratio of BCCI stood on firm
legal ground, thereby necessarily implying that the
automatic stay resurrected by the 2019 Act was struck down,
balance, if any, shall be forfeited and paid to the other
party.
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd.,
2019 (2) ARBLR 359 (SC) (India).
188
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359, 360 (SC) (India).
189
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359, 375 (SC) (India).
190
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359, 370–71 (SC) (India) (quoting ABL Int’l Ltd. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corp. of India, 3 SCC 553 (2004) (India)).
191
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359, 379 (SC) (India) (observing that “deterring a party to an
arbitration from invoking this alternative dispute resolution process by a predeposit of ten percent would discourage arbitration, contrary to the object of declogging the Court system, and would render the arbitral process ineffective and
expensive.”).
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and all amendments made by the 2015 Act would continue
to apply to all court proceedings after October 23, 2015.192
Notably, a key finding of BCCI—which finds reaffirmation
in this decision—is that the introduction of Section 87 would
result in an inordinate delay in the disposal of arbitration
proceedings, as well as increased judicial intervention—
contrary to the objects of the 1996 Act.193 Lastly, having
already held that Section 87 violated Article 14 of the 1950
Constitution, the SCI deemed it unnecessary to examine the
constitutional challenge to the 2019 Act based on Article
19(1)(g), 21 and 300-A of the 1950 Constitution.194
IV. ENFORCING ARBITRAL AWARDS – WAY
FORWARD FOR THE AWARD DEBTOR AND
AWARD CREDITOR
The HCC decision ensured that awards are
enforceable per se as envisioned in the objects and purposes
of the 1996 Act; courts henceforth shall decide applications
for adjourning enforcement pending an application for
setting aside the award.195 In saying so, the dictum reiterated
that any opinion contrary to the above-stated principle would
only highlight the futility of the arbitral process and result in
the denial of the benefits derived from the award.196
Noting the possibility of the award debtor and the
creditor rushing to the court for their respective applications
for relief, this research attempts to understand the rights of
the respective parties to an arbitration when applying for
post-award relief. The following narrative identifies the
relevant legal provisions and the procedure for making such
applications. The authors suggest, exemplifying through
jurisprudence from common law jurisdictions such as
England and Hong Kong, that Indian courts could exercise
192

Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India).
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR SC 122, 180 (2020) (India).
194
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR SC 122, 185 (2020) (India).
195
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR SC 122 (2020) (India).
196
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2)
ARBLR 359, 360 (SC) (India).
193
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the discretion on staying enforcement of the arbitral
awards—sparingly, and for well-founded reasons—with
adequate security for the enforcement when the application
to set-aside remains sub-judice.
Pending a decision upon an enforcement application
by the award-creditor, the award-debtor could utilise a few
legal provisions for relief.197 The first step in this regard is
the authority on interim measures.198 Section 9 of the 1996
Act helps preserve the various pursuits and rights of the
parties to the arbitration.199 As evidenced by the text of this
provision, the parties can apply for post-award interim
measures; however, such an application could also be
pursued in conjunction with an application under section 34
197

Kartikey Mahajan, Making the Case for Post-Award Interim Relief for
Award Debtor, 3 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 14, 14 (2014).
198
Mahajan, supra note 197, at 15.
199
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9.
Interim measures, etc., by Court.—A party may, before
or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the
making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in
accordance with section 36, apply to a court—(i) for the
appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of
unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings;
or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of
any of the following matters, namely:—(a) the
preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which
are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b)
securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the
detention, preservation or inspection of any property or
thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in
arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein
and authorizing for any of the aforesaid purposes any
person to enter upon any land or building in the
possession of any party, or authorizing any samples to be
taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be
tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the
purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d)
interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e)
such other interim measure of protection as may appear
to the court to be just and convenient, And the Court shall
have the same power for making orders as it has for the
purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9.
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of the 1996 Act for declaration of the arbitral award as a
nullity.200 An interim order helps secure the immediate
purpose of protecting the subject matter of the arbitration.201
These orders help prevent the claim from being frustrated in
arbitration.202 The award-debtor could consider applying for
interim measures to secure the arbitral claim from being
alienated or rendered otiose while the court considers the
Section 34 application in order to protect its interests.203 The
importance of an application for interim protection measures
is heightened by the possibility that were the award-debtor
to be successful in a proceeding to set aside the arbitral
award, it would still not be of any material value if the
subject matter itself has been irretrievably lost.204 The
award-debtor could also take the benefit of a Section 9
application when the court has, per section 34(4) of the 1996
Act, decided to adjourn the proceedings and return the award
to the tribunal for reconsideration.205 In Firm Ashok Traders
v. Das Saluja,206 the SCI held that a Section 9 application
could be made by any party to an arbitration agreement as
per the requisites specified therein.207
“Party” is defined in Clause (h) of Subsection (1) of Section 2 of A & C Act to
mean a party to an arbitration agreement.
So, the right conferred by Section 9 is on a
party to an arbitration agreement. The time
or the stage for invoking the jurisdiction of
Court under Section 9 can be (i) before, or
(ii) during arbitral proceeding, or (iii) at
200

Mahajan, supra note 197, at 18.
Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17.
202
Mahajan, supra note 197, at 16.
203
Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17.
204
Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17.
205
Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17 n. 14; see also Cybernetics Network, Priv.
Ltd. v. Bisquare Techs., Priv. Ltd., (2012) 188 D.L.T. 172 (India).
206
Firm Ashok Traders v. Das Saluja, (2004) 3 SCC 155 (India).
207
Kartikey Mahajan, Making the Case for Post-Award Interim Relief for
Award Debtor, 3 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 14, 19 (2014).
201
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any time after the making of the arbitral
award but before it is enforced in
accordance
with
Section
36.208
The Delhi High Court in NHAI v. China Coal
Construction Group Corp. relied on the abovementioned
precedent when it ruled that a Section 9 application of the
parties to the arbitration agreement is available until the
enforcement application is decided upon under Section 36 of
the 1996 Act.209
Reading the section as a whole it appears to
us that the court has jurisdiction to entertain
an application under Section 9 either
before arbitral proceedings or during
arbitral proceedings or after the making of
the arbitral award but before it is enforced
in accordance with Section 36 of the
Act.210
The award-debtor could also apply for setting aside
the arbitral award under Section 34.211 Setting aside
procedures act as a check on the arbitrators, to prevent them
from acting beyond the scope of their authority.212 The law
requires that all arbitral awards shall be spoken orders and
mandates recorded for the same reasons.213 In State Trading
208

Mahajan, supra note 197, at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Arbitration
and Conciliation Act § 9).
209
NHAI v. China Coal Constr. Group Corp., AIR 2006 Delhi 134 (India).
210
NHAI v. China Coal Constr. Group Corp., AIR 2006 Delhi 134 (India).
211
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43.
212
K.D. Kerameus, Waiver of Setting-Aside Procedures in International
Arbitration, 41 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 73, 73–74 (1993).
213
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §31.
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.— . . . . (3) The
arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is
based, unless—
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are
to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed
terms under section 30.
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Corp. of India v. Toepfer International Asia, Private Ltd.,214
the Delhi High Court explained that an order to set aside an
arbitral award “operates to negate a decision, in whole or in
part, thereby depriving the portion negated of legal force and
returning the parties, as to that portion, to their original
litigating positions.”215 This shall be attempted based upon
the record of the lis, and there shall be no evidence adduced
by the court.216 In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers,
Private Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities, Priv. Ltd.,217 the Court
observed,
A court does not sit in appeal over the
award of an arbitral tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence.
An award can be challenged only under the
grounds mentioned in section 34(2) of the
Act. . . . Therefore, in the absence of any
ground under section 34(2) of the Act, it is
not possible to re-examine the facts to find

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §31.
214
State Trading Corp. of India v. Toepfer Int’l Asia, Priv. Ltd., 2014 ARBLR
105 (Delhi) (India).
215
State Trading Corp. of India v. Toepfer Int’l Asia, Priv. Ltd., 2014 ARBLR
105
(Delhi)
(India);
see also Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam, Ltd. v. Reddy, AIR 2007 SC 817 (India)
(discussing the position of setting aside partial awards). The Supreme Court
has modified arbitral awards by reducing the rate of interest. Krishna Bhagya
Jala Nigam, Ltd. v. Reddy, AIR 2007 SC 817 (India). But see Chief Eng’r v.
Chandragiri Constr. Co. 2011 (2) CTC 669 (India); (the Madras High Court
modifying the decision of the district court by dismissing the petition for setting
aside the award by reducing the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal); see
also Poysha Oxygen, Priv. Ltd. v. Suri, ILR (2009) Supp. (3) Delhi 223.
216
In Sial Bioenergie v. SBEC Sys., the High Court of Delhi inter alia held "the
whole purpose of the 1996 Act would be completely defeated by granting
permission to the applicant/JD to lead oral evidence at the stage of objections
raised against an arbitral award. The 1996 Act requires expeditious disposal of
the objections and the minimal interference by the Court. . . .” AIR 2005 Del
95 (India).
217
P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers, Priv. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Secs., Priv. Ltd.,
(2012) 1 SCC 594 (India).
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out whether a different decision can be
arrived at.218
Section 34 provides “for annulment only on the grounds
affecting the legitimacy of the process of decision as distinct
from substantive correctness of the contents of the
A Section 34 application, therefore,
decision.”219
necessarily does not result in the court becoming an
appellate forum for relief.220 In Associate Builders v. Delhi
Development Authority,221 the SCI explained that:
An arbitral tribunal must decide in
accordance with the terms of the contract,
but if an arbitrator construes a term of the
contract in a reasonable manner, it will not
mean that the award can be set aside on this
ground. Construction of the terms of a
contract is primarily for an arbitrator to
decide unless the arbitrator construes the
contract in such a way that it could be said
to be something that no fair minded or
reasonable person could do.222
Given the legislative objectives and the emphasis
against judicial intervention, the award-debtor could
consider applying to the court for remission of the award to
the tribunal.223
Informed by Article 34(4) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, section 34(4) of the 1996 Act
provides for the suspension of setting aside proceedings by
the court for a period determined by it, where appropriate
and so requested by a party, to allow the arbitral tribunal an
opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take
such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will
218

P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers Priv. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Sec. Priv. Ltd.
(2012) 1 SCC 594 (India).
219
Delhi Dev. Auth. v. Bhardwaj Brothers, AIR 2014 DELHI 147 (India).
220
Delhi Dev. Auth. v. Bhardwaj Brothers, AIR 2014 DELHI 147 (India).
221
Assoc. Builders v. Delhi Dev. Auth., 2014 (4) ARBLR 307 (SC) (India).
222
Assoc. Builders v. Delhi Dev. Auth., 2014 (4) ARBLR 307 (SC) (India).
223
See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43.
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eliminate the grounds available for setting aside an award.224
In Dyna Technologies, Private Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves,
Ltd.,225 the award was found to be unintelligible and
inadequately reasoned, and the SCI explained that the
legislative intention of section 34(4) of the 1996 Act “was to
make the award enforceable, after giving an opportunity to
the arbitral tribunal to undo curable defects.”226
Remission applications could also be made when
the arbitration tribunal overlooked a particular “claim on
which the parties led evidence and addressed arguments.”227
A party denied the opportunity to present its case i.e., to deal
with a document relied upon by the arbitral tribunal, could
also apply for remission.228 The SCI in Radha Chemicals v.
Union of India explained that parties seeking remission as
224

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34; see also U.N. COMM’N ON
INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, at 20, U.N.
Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008).
225
Dyna Techs., Priv. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves, Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC
1656 (India).
226
Dyna Techs., Priv. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves, Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC
1656 (India).
227
See generally Geojit Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Nagpal, (Appeal No. 35 of 2013 in
Arbitration Petition No. 47 of 2009 Bombay HC). In Reliance Indus., Ltd. v.
Union of India, the English Commercial Court considered a remitted award
under the English Arbitration Act of 1996. [2020] EWHC (Comm) 263 (Eng.).
In a dispute concerning issues of cost recovery in relation to two production
sharing contracts, the court laid a roadmap, elaborating upon the Tribunal’s task
when addressing remitted issues. Reliance Indus., Ltd. v. Union of India,
[2020] EWHC (Comm) 263 (Eng.). The principles specified in the decision
were: (a) in spite of an intention to reject a case, the Tribunal was still obligated
to issue an award containing that decision which should take into account any
evidence which was on the record but not considered by the Tribunal; and (b)
the issues to be remitted to the Tribunal have to be explicitly specified in the
court’s order of remission. Reliance Indus., Ltd. v. Union of India, [2020]
EWHC (Comm) 263 (Eng.); see also Andrew Cannon & Hannah Ambrose,
English Court considers challenges to a further award made after Remission to
the Tribunal following an earlier successful challenge, HBF (June 4, 2020),
https://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2020/06/04/english-court-considerschallenges-to-a-further-award-made-after-remission-to-the-tribunal-followingan-earlier-successful-challenge/.
228
MMTC v. Vicnivass Agency, 2009 (1) MLJ 199 (India).
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per section 34(4) of the 1996 Act must do so before the court
decided upon the set-aside application in the Section 34
proceedings.229
Subsection (3) of Section 34 specifies that an
application for setting aside the award may be made within
a period of three months from the date of delivery of the
award; the award-debtor could apply for an extension of this
period by thirty days to the court which may satisfy itself as
to the explanation for the delay.230 In Union of India v.
Popular Construction Co., the Court was called to decide
upon the applicability of the Limitation Act of 1963 (“1963
Act”) to an application for setting aside the arbitral award
under section 34.231 Noting, apart from other provisions of
the 1996 Act, the intention of the legislature as evident in the
wording of the proviso of Section 34(3) which states “but
not thereafter[,]” the Court held against such application of
the 1963 Act.232 Where an application for correction or
modification of the award, as per Section 33,233 is pending

229

Radha Chems. v. Union of India, (Order dated Oct. 10, 2018, Sup. Ct. in Civ.
Appeal No. 10386 of 2018) (India); see also Mullick v. Das Damani, (2018) 11
SCC 328 (India).
230
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34:
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had received the
arbitral award or, if a request had been made under
section 33, from the date on which that request had been
disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the
Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient cause from making the application within the
said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, § 34; see Exec. Eng’r v. Satya
Prakash & Brothers, Priv. Ltd., 2018 (4) ARBLR 241 (Allahabad) (India).
231
Union of India v. Popular Constr. Co., AIR 2001 SC 4010 (India).
232
Union of India v. Popular Constr. Co., AIR 2001 SC 4010 (India).
233
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §33:
Correction and interpretation of award; additional
award—
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before the arbitral tribunal, the limitation would start running
from the date on which the request has been disposed of by
the tribunal.234
Section 37 of the 1996 Act specifies the statutory
right to appeal against certain orders explicitly mentioned in

(1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the
arbitral award, unless another period of time has been
agreed upon by the parties—(a) a party, with notice to
the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to
correct any computation errors, any clerical or
typographical errors or any other errors of a similar
nature occurring in the award; (b) if so agreed by the
parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may
request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a
specific point or part of the award.
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the
request made under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall
make the correction or give the interpretation within
thirty days from the receipt of the request and the
interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award.
(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error
of the type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), on
its own initiative, within thirty days from the date of the
arbitral award.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a
party with notice to the other party, may request, within
thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the
arbitral tribunal to make an additional arbitral award as
to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but
omitted from the arbitral award.
(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the
request made under sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall
make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from
the receipt of such request.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if
necessary, the period of time within which it shall make
a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional
arbitral award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5).
(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or
interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional
arbitral award made under this section.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §33.
234
Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Eng’rs, (2010) 12 SCC 210 (India)
(citing The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3)).

245

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021

51

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]

The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

the aforesaid provision.235 It is important to note that the
phrase “an appeal shall lie from the following orders (and
from no others)” leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
legislature has taken away the right to appeal against all
orders except as specified in sub-clauses (1) and (2).236
Notably, the appealable orders allowed by the section are: (i)
granting or refusing to grant any interim measure of
protection by the court under section 9; (ii) setting aside or
refusing to set aside an arbitral award by the court under
section 34; (iii) accepting the plea of lack of its jurisdiction
by the arbitral tribunal under section 16(2); (iv) accepting the
plea of excess of scope of its authority by the arbitral tribunal
under section 16(3); and (v) granting or refusing to grant an
interim measure of protection by the arbitral tribunal under
section 17.237
For the present research, the authors will analyze
the overlap and interplay between the 1963 Act and Section
37 of the 1996 Act to highlight specific time constraints
which an aggrieved award-debtor and award-creditor must
adhere to. It is important to note that the limitation
prescribed under Section 34(3) for an application to set aside
an award is four months, including a gratis of thirty days in
case the applicant shows sufficient cause.238 Similarly, in
Union of India v. Varindera Construction Ltd,239 the SCI
found the delay to be 142 days in filing the appeal and 103
days in refiling the appeal.240 Observing that there was no
sufficient cause made out explaining the delay, and that the
appeal was filed after the expiry of 120 days, the SCI refused
to entertain the appeal.241 It opined,

235

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43.
237
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §37.
238
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3).
239
Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India).
240
Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India).
241
Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India).
236
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any delay beyond 120 days in the filing of
an appeal under § 37 from an application
being either dismissed or allowed under §
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 should not be allowed as it will defeat
the overall statutory purpose of arbitration
proceedings being decided with utmost
dispatch.242
The SCI echoed this position in a recent decision in
N.V. International v. State of Assam,243 wherein it expressed
disfavor for condoning any delay beyond 120 days in filing
an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. The Court
observed,
[w]e may only add that what we have done
in the aforesaid judgment is to add to the
period of ninety days, which is provided by
statute for filing of appeals under [Section]
37 of the Arbitration Act, a grace period of
thirty days under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act by following Lachmeshwar
Prasad Shukul and Others (supra), as also
having regard to the object of speedy
resolution of all arbitral disputes which was
uppermost in the minds of the framers of
the 1996 Act, and which has been
strengthened from time to time by
amendments made thereto. The present
delay being beyond 120 days is not liable,
therefore, to be condoned.244
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act allows courts to
address the award through the lens of public policy, however
the term itself remained undefined except for guidance
provided in the explanation stating that an award induced by
242

Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India).
N.V. International v. State of Assam, 2020(1) ARBLR 472 (SC) (India).
244
N.V. International v. State of Assam, 2020(1) ARBLR 472 (SC) (India).
243

247

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021

53

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]

The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

fraud or corruption would infringe upon India’s public
policy.245 The 1940 Act did not mention public policy,
though Section 30 said that an award could be set aside if the
same “had been improperly procured or was otherwise
invalid.”246 The Act borrowed the content of public policy,
as applied to arbitration, from the Indian Contract Act of
1872.247 In Central Inland Water Transport Corp. v.
Brojonath Ganguly, the SCI explained the content of public
policy as a dynamic concept guided by public interest, public
good, and above all, the constitutional principles of
fundamental rights and directive principles.248
The contours of public policy in the context of
arbitration were subjected to extensive articulation in ONGC
v. Saw Pipes,249 which remained the precedent on many
occasions.250 In that case, the arbitral tribunal ordered
liquidated damages, as agreed in the contract, in favor of the
Respondent, which the Court found erroneous for being
violative of the express provisions of the Indian Contract Act
of 1872 concerning liquidated damages.251 Consequently,
according to the SCI, the arbitral award suffered from patent
error of law, and was therefore liable to be set aside for
contravening the public policy of India.252 Explaining that
the domestic award could be annulled if it was opposed to
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law, (b) the interest of
India, (c) justice or morality, or (d) if it is patently illegal,
245

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(2)(b)(ii).
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(2)(b)(ii).
247
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3).
248
Cent. Inland Water Transp. Corp. v. Brojonath Ganguly., (1986) 3 SCC 156
¶ 95 (India).
249
ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India).
250
Hindustan Zinc Ltd v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445
(India); see also Shipping Corp. of India v. Mare Shipping Inc., (2011) 8 SCC
39 ¶ 25 (India) (reasoning "it was indicated therein that if the Award passed by
the Arbitral Tribunal was contrary to any of the provisions of the Act or the
substantive law governing the parties or was against the terms of the contract,
the same could be set aside.")
251
ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India).
252
ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India).
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the SCI thus added a new ground within public policy, i.e.,
patent illegality, while clarifying that the illegality had to go
to the root of the matter and not be of trivial nature.253 The
Court justified the inclusion on the ground that an award that
patently infringed provisions of substantive law would
“adversely affect the administration of justice” and therefore
invariably be contrary to the public interest.254 The Delhi
High Court in NPCC v. Rajdhani Builders clarified that an
arbitral award would be patently illegal if it were contrary to
(a) substantive provisions of law, (b) provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, or (c) the terms of the
contract.255 In Associate Builders v. DDA, the Supreme
Court held patent illegality to include: (i) a contravention of
the substantive law of India, such contravention being patent
and substantive as to be violating Section 28(1)(a); (ii) a
violation of the 1996 Act; or (iii) ignoring the terms of the
contract or failing to take into account usages of trade
applicable to the transaction in contravention of Section
28(3).256
Following the 2015 Act, patent illegality, as a
ground for setting aside an award, received statutory force in
Section 34(2A).257 The Supreme Court in Ssangyong
253

ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India).
ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India).
255
NPCC v. Rajdhani Builders, (2006) (2) ARBLR 219 (Delhi).
256
Assoc. Builders v. Delhi Dev. Auth., 2014 (4) ARBLR 307 (SC) 31–34
(India).
257
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
[Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public
policy of India, only if,—
(i) the making of the award was induced or
affected by fraud or corruption or was in
violation of section 75 or section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic
notions of morality or justice.
Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as
to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental
254
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Engineering & Construction Ltd. v. National Highways
Authority of India explained that the new criterion does not
apply to the contravention of a statute not linked to public
policy or public interest, which is not subsumed within the
fundamental policy of Indian law.258 Affirming Ssangyong
with regard to patent illegality, the SCI in Patel Engineering
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corp. explained that an
arbitral award would be in contravention of point (iii) in
Explanation One of Section 34(2)(b) if the Court finds the
decision of the arbitrator to be “perverse, or, so irrational that
no reasonable person would have arrived at the same; or, the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable
person would take; or, the view of the arbitrator is not even
a possible view,” then the Court is required to set aside the
reward as being patently illegal.259 This subhead of patent
illegality, which is to be read together with point (iii), would
be in addition to point (ii).260
The award-creditor, per Section 9, is entitled to file
an application for interim measures to protect or conserve
the subject matter of the award, as such measures envisaged
are intended to prevent an arbitral claim from being
frustrated.261 Applications for such relief in the case of prepolicy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the
merits of the dispute.]
[(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other
than international commercial arbitrations, may also be
set aside by the Court if the Court finds that the award is
vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on
the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciating evidence.]
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.
258
Ssangyong Eng’g and Constr. Ltd. v. Nat’l Highways Auth. of India, AIR
2019 SC 5041 (India).
259
Patel Eng’g Ltd. v. N. E. Elec. Power Corp., Order dated May 22, 2020 in
Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3584-85 of 2020 (India).
260
See generally Patel Eng’g Ltd. v. N. E. Elec. Power Corp., Order dated May
22, 2020 in Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3584-85 of 2020 (India).
261
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9.
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enforcement of an arbitral award are intended to protect the
value of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of
the arbitral award. In Dirk India Private Ltd,262 the Bombay
High Court noted that the enforcement of an award accrues
to the benefit of the party who has secured an award in the
arbitral proceedings and observed that the enforceability of
an award under Section 36, therefore, has to take note of the
relative presence of these two time frames.263 It, therefore,
held contextually “the scheme of Section 9 postulates an
application for the grant of an interim measure of protection
after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced
for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the
award.”264
DECIDING APPLICATIONS FOR STAY ON
ENFORCEMENT – WAY FORWARD
Given that the HCC dictum removed the “automatic
stay” upon enforcement of an arbitral award as per Section
36 of the 1996 Act,265 courts now retain discretion to order
stay on enforcement pending disposal of an application for
challenge, provided the award-debtor has applied for such
relief of stay on enforcement.266 Subsection 3 specifies that
courts may, for reasons recorded, order a stay of
enforcement pending disposal of an application for setting
aside the arbitral award while imposing such conditions as it
may deem fit.267 Subsection 4 specifies that the courts take
note of the provisions related to money decrees within the
1908 CPC,268 whilst ordering such stay on enforcement of
262

Dirk India Priv. Ltd v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7)
Bom CR 493 (Bombay).
263
Dirk India Priv. Ltd v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7)
Bom CR 493 (Bombay).
264
Dirk India Priv. Ltd v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7)
Bom CR 493 (Bombay).
265
As per the 2015 Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2015.
266
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.
267
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36(3).
268
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. 21, Rule 1.
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an arbitral award for payment of money. Section 36, as
applied in HCC, is now aligned with the pro-arbitration
approach enunciated in the UNCITRAL Model Law.269
That said, there is little guidance with regard to the
interpretation of the provisions related to exercise of
discretion as per Section 36(2) and concerning the
imposition of conditions for grant of stay as per Section
36(3).270 The authors would like to suggest that Indian
courts could gain useful insights from the development of
law in other jurisdictions; they suggest a few such instances
that offer interesting comprehensions on state practice in this
regard.
In L v. B,271 the Hong Kong Court of First Instance
granted a stay on the enforcement of the award pending setaside proceedings. Though the dispute arose in a foreignseated arbitration and proceedings were initiated in relation
to declaration of the award’s nullity, the Court took
jurisdiction over the applications—one by the applicant
seeking security for enforcement, and the other by the
respondent seeking stay of enforcement of the award
pending disposal of the challenge to the award at the seat (the
Bahamas).272 The Court took note of the following legal
principles:
• Strength of the argument that the
award is invalid—if the award is
manifestly invalid, there should be an
adjournment and no order for security,
whereas if it is manifestly valid, there
should either be an order for
immediate enforcement or else an
order for substantial security; and

269

Holtzmann & Neuhaus, supra, note 106.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36(2) & (3).
271
L v. B, [2016], HCCT 41/2015, (C.F.I.).
272
L v. B, HCCT 41/2015.
270
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•

Ease or difficulty of enforcement of
the award—consideration of whether
enforcement of the award will be
rendered more difficult if enforcement
is delayed.273
The Court noted the nature of the set aside challenge
presented by the Respondent in the curial jurisdiction to be
of a minor irregularity, and therefore ordered a four-month
stay of the enforcement proceedings on condition that the
Respondent deposited the requested security within twentyone days.274 The Applicant’s costs of the application for
security were granted on an indemnity basis.275
For reasons of comity and on an assessment of
managing unwarranted delays in enforcement of awards
through ordering security for such enforcement, an English
court in AIC Ltd. v. Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria
decided to adjourn the enforcement of an award in England
and order security pending the outcome of a set-aside
application before a foreign court.276 An award rendered in
Nigeria, and the subject matter of judicial proceedings
therein, was sought to be enforced in England.277 Against
the claimant’s application for enforcement, the defendant
applied for adjournment of the proceedings pending decision
in the Nigerian proceedings.278 Section 103(5) of the
English Arbitration Act of 1996 gives the English court the
power to adjourn a decision on enforcement if an application
273

L v. B, HCCT 41/2015.
L v. B, HCCT 41/2015.
L v. B, HCCT 41/2015.
276
AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212; see
Melanie Martin, English Court Adjourns Enforcement of Nigerian
Arbitral Award, K LUWER A RB . B LOG (Oct. 14, 2019),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/10/14/englishcourt-adjourns-enforcement-ofnigerianarbitralaward/?doing_wp_cron=1591390468.789436101913
4521484375.
277
AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212.
278
AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212.
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to set aside or suspend an award has been made in the
country of arbitration.279 In such circumstances, the court
also has the power to make it a condition of the adjournment
that security is provided.280 Weighing the possibility of the
defendant’s successful pursuit in having the arbitral award
declared a nullity and the need to ensure protection against
deterioration in its prospects of enforcement in England, and
the award together with interest was a large sum of money
for it to be deprived of, the court ordered the adjournment to
be conditional on the defendant providing security of $24
million which represented 50% of the award or
approximately three years’ worth of interest on the award.281
The decision articulated an important methodology for
courts to adopt in identifying the factors to consider when
exercising discretion with regard to deciding applications
related to stay and adjournment.282 These factors hold
valuable guidance that Indian courts could benefit from in
deciding competing applications for stay and enforcement,
so that courts may ensure the integrity of the arbitral process
not be at risk:
• Acknowledgement of the expansive
discretion
with
regard
to
adjournment applications;
• Assess the legitimacy of the setaside application, insulate against
dilatory tactics;
• Assessment of the possibility of the
set-aside
application
being
successful determined on a "sliding
scale" whether the facts suggested

279

AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212; see
Arbitration Act 1996 (UK).
280
AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212.
281
AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212.
282
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a
"manifestly
invalid" or
"manifestly valid" award;
• The stronger the merits of the
foreign proceedings, the stronger
the case for an adjournment and the
weaker the case for security (and
vice versa);
• The possible prejudicial impact of
the stay on the party seeking
enforcement; and
• Such
assessment
related
to
prejudice
should
make
a
comparative assessment of the
position of the enforcing party were
the enforcement allowed to proceed
as against the position if the
enforcement was delayed, the
quantum of the security reflecting
the degree of prejudice. 283
In conclusion, courts in India could draw
inspiration from the jurisprudence on Article VI, NYC
wherein it has been stated that a court of a contracting
state “may, if it considers it proper, adjourn”
proceedings and “may also . . . order the other party to
give suitable security.”284 In light of the “permissive
language” of Article VI, courts have full discretion to
283

AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212.
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE ON
THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS, at 263, U.N. Sales No. E.16.V.7 (1958); see Emmanuel
Gaillard & Benjamin Siino, The Guide to Challenging and Enforcing
Arbitration Awards: Enforcement Under the New York Convention, GLOBAL
ARB.
REV.
1,
86
(2019)
https://res.cloudinary.com/fieldfisher/image/upload/v1574347192/PDFFiles/PDFs%20from%20old%20website/6-due-process-and-proceduralirregularities-challenges_azwhjh.pdf; Rena Rico, Searching for Standards:
Suspension of Enforcement Proceedings under Article VI of the New York
Convention, 1 ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 69, 77 (2005).
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adjourn enforcement proceedings or order the defendant to
provide security.285 As noted by the Supreme Court of Hong
Kong,286 use of the term “may” indicates that the application
for adjournment is a matter of discretion. Noting the stated
purposes of the 1996 Act and the subsequent law reform
ushering more commitment to the same, Indian courts
should contribute to that commitment as well by exercising
the discretion related to ordering stay on enforcement of
awards while cautiously ensuring that they would not unduly
interfere with the arbitral process.287 They have much
inspiration from other jurisdictions in that regard.
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U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., supra note 284.
Hebei Import & Export Corp v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1996] 3 H.K.C 725; see
also Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, 156 F. 3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.
1998).
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